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An Improved LM Curve 
By  MARTIN HIERMEYER* 
Over the last decades, the LM curve has largely disap-
peared from research and, to some extent, also from teaching. 
Because of its well-known weaknesses, the LM curve is now 
frequently replaced with an interest rate rule. The paper sug-
gests an improved LM curve which gets rid of the weak-
nesses of the LM curve but, unlike an interest rate rule, re-
tains the LM curve’s strength of including money, and even 
expands upon this strength. 
* German Ministry of Finance, Wilhelmstr. 97, 10117 Berlin (e-mail: m.hiermeyer@gmx.de). 
 
 
I. Introduction 
The LM curve is given by the following equation. 
(LM) M = L(i, Y),     with L’(i) < 0 and L’(Y) > 0               
The variables are:  
  M:   Money  i:   Interest rate Y:   Output 
 
For decades, the LM curve was routinely used to close a two-equation 
system consisting of an IS curve, and a price setting, or aggregate supply, 
curve. Today, this system is instead usually closed by an interest rate rule 
(Friedman 2003).  
Unlike the LM curve, an interest rate rule does not include money. Thus, 
if there is any money at all in the resulting models, money is introduced 
separately, for example by including money in the utility function of a 
household, by making money a prerequisite for transactions, or by intro-
ducing some form of public finance budget accounting (Walsh 2017). 
Following Clarida et al. (1999), the trend away from the LM curve is 
particularly pronounced in research. In teaching, the LM curve has held its 
ground better as many undergraduate textbooks still choose to present the 
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IS-LM-AS model (e.g. Abel, Bernanke and Croushore 2017, Blanchard 
2017, Dwivedi 2015, Froyen 2013, Heijdra 2017 or Mankiw 2016). 
The resulting disconnect between teaching and research is often la-
mented (e.g. Carlin and Soskice 2005) and has led to the development of 
undergraduate-level models that replace the LM curve with an interest rate 
rule. Examples include the IS-MP-IA model of Romer (2000), the IS-PC-
MR model of Carlin and Soskice (2005), or the models of Allsopp and 
Vines (2000), Taylor (2000), Walsh (2002) and Bofinger et al. (2006). 
However, many textbook authors do not seem to be convinced by those 
models. For example, Mankiw (2006) gives detailed reasons for rejecting 
the IS-PC-MR model in favor of the IS-LM-AS model – despite the LM 
curve’s well-known weaknesses. 
This paper suggests an improved LM curve – both for teaching and re-
search – which gets rid of the weaknesses of the LM curve, retains the LM 
curve’s strength of including money, and expands upon this strength.  
II. Weaknesses Of The LM Curve 
The LM curve has four well-known weaknesses. 
Weakness 1. The LM curve assumes that the central bank targets money 
M. This is considered a weakness since today most central banks target an 
interest rate such as the federal funds rate rather than money (e.g. Goodhart 
2009). 
Weakness 2: The LM curve’s money measure M is undefined. Is it high-
powered money? M1 money? Some other money measure? There is no ob-
vious answer as “M” exhibits characteristics of several money measures 
(e.g. Romer 2000). 
Weakness 3. The LM curve is unclear about its interest rate i. Some con-
fusion is related to the confusion about money M. After all, since the inter-
est rate i is supposed to clear the market for money M, this again raises the 
question: Which money M? The confusion is heightened by the fact that 
the LM curve is usually combined with an IS curve that shares its interest 
rate i. In a simple form, such an IS curve is given by the following equation. 
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(IS) Y = C + I(i) + G,     with I’(i) < 0               
The variables, if not already defined, are: 
C: Consumption spending G: Government spending 
I: Investment spending   
  
Apparently, the interest rate i thus clears two markets: The IS equation's 
“goods market” and the LM equation's money market – despite the fact, 
that the two markets have different interest rates (e.g. Romer 2000). 
Weakness 4. The LM curve cannot explain unconventional monetary 
policy. It includes only one money measure M, which the central bank al-
ready targets in conventional monetary policy. Thus, no distinction can be 
made between conventional and unconventional monetary policy.  
III. An Improved LM Curve 
The improved LM curve is based on two accounting identities and four 
plausible assumptions. 
(1) HPM  CHP + ER + RR 
(2)  RR  rrD,     with 0 < rr ≤ 1 
(3)  HPM = HPM(ffr),     with HPM’(ffr) < 0 
(4)  CHP = CHP(i),     with CHP’(i) < 0 
(5)  ER = ER(i),     with ER’(i) < 0 
(6)  D = D(Y),     with D’(Y) > 0 
The variables, if not already defined, are: 
HPM: High-powered money rr: Reserve ratio 
CHP: Currency held by the public D: Demand deposits 
 ER: Excess reserves ffr: Federal funds rate 
RR: Required reserves   
 
Equation (1) defines the components of high-powered money.  
4 
 
Equation (2) defines the reserve ratio.  
Equation (3) assumes that demand for high-powered money decreases 
with the federal funds rate. This is plausible as the federal funds rate is the 
interest rate on high-powered money. 
Equation (4) assumes that the demand for currency held by the public 
decreases with the interest rate i. This is plausible as the interest rate i re-
flects the opportunity cost of holding currency instead of paying the cur-
rency into a bank savings account. 
Equation (5) assumes that excess reserves decrease with the interest rate 
i. This is plausible as the interest rate i reflects the opportunity cost of hold-
ing excess reserves instead of making loans. 
Equation (6) assumes that demand for demand deposits increases with 
output. This is plausible. Output implies transactions. Transactions imply 
M1 money, as payment with M1 money (currency, check, direct debit or 
bank wire transfer) is generally the only accepted method of payment. M1 
money finally implies currency or demand deposits as M1 money is defined 
as follows: 
(7) M1  CHP + D 
 
Combining equations (1) through (6) yields the improved LM equation. 
(I-LM) HPM(ffr) = CHP(i) + ER(i) + rrD(Y), 
                            with HPM(ffr)’(i) = CHP’(i) + ER’(i) < 0 
                                   and HPM(ffr)’(Y) = rrD’(Y) > 0 
 
Thus, the I-LM curve replaces the LM curve’s endogenous variable “M” 
with five endogenous variables: With high-powered money HPM, with the 
federal funds rate ffr, with currency held by the public CHP, with excess 
reserves ER, with the reserve ratio rr and with demand deposits D. For 
L’(Y) = rrD’(Y) and L’(i) = CHP’(i) + ER’(i), both curves have the same 
slope (Figure 1).  
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FIGURE 1. LM CURVE (LEFT) AND IMPROVED LM CURVE (RIGHT). 
 
IV. Understanding The Improved LM Curve 
To fully understand the I-LM curve, consider both a rightward shift in 
the I-LM curve and a movement along the I-LM curve. 
A. Rightward Shift In The Improved LM Curve 
Let’s consider the case of a one-percentage point reduction in the federal 
funds rate ffr. For HPM’(ffr) = -2, rr = 0.1 and D’(Y) = 1, this shifts the I-
LM curve to the right by $20 in line with equation (8). 
(8) dY/dffr = HPM’(ffr)/rrD’(Y) < 0 
Table 1 shows what happens step-by-step, assuming arbitrary initial values 
for the involved variables. 
 
TABLE 1—SHIFT IN THE I-LM CURVE (MONEY MULTIPLIER) 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Currency held by the public (CHP) $60 $60 $60 
Excess reserves (ER) $31 $33 $31 
Required reserves (RR) $9 $9 $11 
High-powered money (HPM)    [HPM = CHP + ER + RR] $100 $102 $102 
Additional loans $300 $300 $320 
Demand deposits (D)                  [D = RR/rr] $90 $90 $110 
M1 money (M1)                         [M1 = CHP + D] $150 $150 $170 
Output (Y) $50 $50 $70 
Column (1) shows the economy before the Fed reduces the federal funds 
rate.  
In column (2), the Fed now reduces the federal funds target rate by one 
percentage point. To meet the lower federal funds target rate, the Fed’s 
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New York traders lend $2 more in high-powered money to banks (given 
HPM’(ffr)= -2). Banks initially add the additional high-powered money to 
excess reserves. In line with that, excess reserves and high-powered money 
increase by $2 to $33 and $102, respectively.  
In column (3), banks use the additional $2 of excess reserves to make 
additional loans totaling $20 (given rr = 0.1). When banks make such loans, 
they credit the demand deposits account of the borrower with a demand 
deposit of the size of the loan (so that the borrower can use the money). 
This is the reason why demand deposits increase by $20 from $90 to $110. 
Required reserves increase by $2 from $9 to $11. M1 money, the sum of 
currency held by the public and demand deposits, also increases by $20. 
Output increases by $20 in line with demand deposits as the borrowers 
spend all the borrowed M1 money (given D’(Y) = 1). 
Since a $2 reduction in excess reserves made demand deposits increases 
by $20, the process is also known as the “money multiplier”. 
B. Movement Along The Improved LM Curve 
Let’s consider the case of a one-percentage point increase in the interest 
rate i. For CHP’(i) = -1, ER’(i) = -1, rr = 0.1 and D’(Y) = 1, this increases 
output by $20 in line with equation (9). 
(9) dY/di = -[CHP’(i) + ER’(i)]/rrD’(Y) > 0 
Table 2 shows what happens step-by-step, assuming arbitrary initial values 
for the involved variables.  
 
TABLE 2—MOVEMENT ALONG THE I-LM CURVE (MONEY MULTIPLIER) 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Currency held by the public (CHP) $60 $59 $59 
Excess reserves (ER) $31 $32 $30 
Required reserves (RR) $9 $9 $11 
High-powered money (HPM)    [HPM = CHP + ER + RR] $100 $100 $100 
Additional loans $300 $300 $320 
Demand deposits (D)                  [D = RR/rr] $90 $90 $110 
 Savings deposits $200 $201 $201 
M1 money (M1)                         [M1 = CHP + D] $150 $150 $169 
Output (Y) $50 $50 $70 
Column (1) shows the economy before the reduction in the interest rate.  
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In column (2), the lower interest rate now makes the public pay $1 of 
currency into their savings accounts (given CHP’(i) = -1) as the higher in-
terest rate increases the opportunity cost of holding currency. Excess re-
serves now stand at $32. This is $2 higher than the desired level (after all, 
given ER’(i) = -1, banks now desire $1 lower excess reserves than in col-
umn (1). 
In column (3), banks use those $2 of excess reserves to make additional 
loans totaling $20 (rr = 0.1). As in Table 1, in turn loans, demand deposits, 
M1 money and output increase by $20. 
Since a $2 reduction in excess reserves made demand deposits increases 
by $20, the process is also known as the “money multiplier”. 
V. Advantages Of The Improved LM Curve 
The I-LM curve has four advantages vis-à-vis the LM curve and, as we 
will see, also vis-à-vis models that replace the LM curve with an interest 
rate rule. 
A. The Fed Targets The Federal Funds Rate By Adjusting High-Pow-
ered Money So That The Target Is Met 
The LM curve is frequently criticized for its assumption that the central 
bank targets money. This is considered a weakness since most central 
banks today target an interest rate such as the federal funds rate rather than 
money. 
In contrast, the I-LM curve assumes that the Fed targets the federal funds 
rate. Even better, the Fed does so by adjusting high-powered money so that 
the target rate is met.  
With that, the I-LM curve goes not only beyond the LM curve. It also 
goes beyond models that replace the LM curve with an interest rate rule. 
After all, as Friedman (2003) points out, these models leave open the un-
derlying question how the central bank manages to fix the chosen interest 
rate in the first place as they do not include high-powered money. 
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B. The I-LM Curve Is Clear About Its Money Measures 
The LM curve is unclear about its money measure “M” which might be 
high-powered money, M1 money or some altogether different aggregate. 
In contrast, the I-LM curve is clear about its money measures as it ex-
plicitly includes the following ones: high-powered money, currency held 
by the public, excess reserves, required reserves and demand deposits. By 
extension, it thus also includes M1 money, the sum of currency held by the 
public and demand deposits. 
With that, the I-LM curve is not only clearer about money than the LM 
curve but also “clearer” about money than models that replace the LM 
curve with an interest rate rule. After all, those models generally do not 
include any variable labeled money at all (Friedman 2003). 
C. The I-LM Curve Is Clear About Its Interest Rates 
The LM curve is unclear about its interest rate i. This interest rate appar-
ently clears two very different markets at once, with one being the market 
for “money” (in whatever definition).  
In contrast, the I-LM curve is clear, distinguishing between the federal 
funds rate ffr on the one hand and the interest rate i on the other hand.  
The federal funds rate ffr operates within the I-LM curve. It clears the 
market for high powered money by matching the supply of high-powered 
money with the demand for high-powered money. 
The interest rate i operates within the “IS-I-LM model” which combines 
equation (IS) with equation (I-LM). The interest rate i clears the market for 
credit by matching the I-LM curve’s additional lending with the IS curve’s 
additional borrowing. 
After all, a rightward shift in the I-LM curve reflects additional lending 
equal to the increase in output (see Table 1). Likewise, a rightward move-
ment along the I-LM curve reflects additional lending equal to the increase 
in output (see Table 2).  
This fits neatly to the IS curve where shifts in the IS curve and move-
ments along the IS curve reflect additional borrowing equal to the increase 
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in output. For example, if the IS curve shifts to the right by $20, this reflects 
a $20 increase in credit-financed consumption, investment or government 
spending. And if a lower interest rate i increases output by $20, this reflects 
a $20 increase in investment spending.  
With that, the I-LM curve goes not only beyond the LM curve. It also 
goes beyond models that replace the LM curve with an interest rate rule. 
After all, there is no credit or banking in these models (Friedman 2003). 
Note that the federal funds rate ffr and the interest rate i may or may not 
co-move. For example, in a fiscal expansion, the Fed holds the federal 
funds rate steady but the interest rate i increases due to the additional gov-
ernment borrowing which the additional government spending brings (see 
Figure 2, left-hand side). In contrast, in a monetary expansion, both the 
federal funds rate and the interest rate i move in the same direction. The 
federal funds rate declines as the Fed reduces it from ffr1 to ffr2, and the 
interest rate i declines as banks push additional loans into the credit market 
(see Figure 2, right-hand side). 
 
 
FIGURE 2. FISCAL EXPANSION (LEFT) AND MONETARY EXPANSION (RIGHT) IN THE IS-I-LM MODEL. 
 
D. The I-LM Curve Can Explain Unconventional Monetary Policy 
The LM curve cannot explain unconventional monetary policy. It in-
cludes only one money measure M, which the central bank already targets 
in conventional monetary policy. Thus, no distinction can be made between 
conventional and unconventional monetary policy. 
In contrast, the I-LM curve can explain unconventional monetary policy. 
If the Fed wants to, it can increase equation (I-LM)’s high-powered money 
directly, bypassing the federal funds rate. It can do so by purchasing assets 
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such as mortgage-backed securities, bank debt or Treasury notes from 
banks with high-powered money (“quantitative easing”).  
The Fed may do so at the zero lower bound, where bank demand for high-
powered money is so low that the federal funds rate has dropped to zero. 
The low demand for high-powered money may be due to banks being un-
willing to lend, say because of strict capital requirements, and/or due to 
firms being unwilling to borrow, say because of general pessimism. In the 
first case, ER(i) → ∞ holds and the I-LM curve is horizontal. In the second 
case, I’(i) = 0 holds and the IS curve is vertical. 
Given that the federal funds rate is already zero, the additional supply of 
high-powered money will not lower the federal funds rate any further. In 
equation (I-LM), high-powered money increases while the federal funds 
rate remains steady at zero. 
The IS-I-LM model shows that such a direct increase in high-powered 
will, however, have little or no effect on aggregate demand if the I-LM 
curve is nearly horizontal, or horizontal (ER(i) → ∞), and/or if the IS curve 
is nearly vertical, or vertical (I’(i) = 0). In this case, the additional high-
powered money will largely, or entirely, end up in currency held by the 
public and in excess reserves. 
And indeed, while quantitative easing increased US high-powered 
money by about 370% from 2008 to 2015, aggregate demand increased 
only modestly while excess reserves exploded by about 1300% (Federal 
Reserve 2018). 
Of course, even in the case of a horizontal I-LM curve and a vertical IS 
curve, policy is not per se powerless. The central bank may use high-pow-
ered money to create demand deposits for the government at banks, thus 
shifting the I-LM curve to the right. The government may then spend this 
money, thus shifting the IS curve to the right. This is the very mechanism 
through which all past hyperinflations came about. 
A tiny dose of such a potential hyperinflation is currently discussed as a 
possible way to reflate low-inflation economies. One catchword is “heli-
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copter money”. In helicopter money, a central bank lends or gifts house-
holds newly created demand deposits, hoping to increase their consumption 
spending. Alternatively, the central bank might also finance some govern-
ment spending directly (“people’s quantitative easing”). 
With that, the I-LM curve goes not only beyond the LM curve. It also 
goes beyond models that replace the LM curve with an interest rate rule. 
After all, these models focus on conventional monetary policy which can 
be described by an interest rate rule and do not include any high-powered 
money. 
VI. Conclusion 
The improved LM curve gets rid of the LM curve’s four weaknesses, 
retains its strength (the inclusion of money), and expands upon this strength 
(section V and Table 3 below).  
 
TABLE 3—LM CURVE VS. INTEREST RATE RULE VS. IMPROVED LM CURVE  
 LM  
Curve 
Interest Rate 
Rule 
 
 
I-LM  
Curve 
Assumes that the central bank targets an interest rate? 
Is clear about its money measures (if any)? 
Is clear about its interest rate(s)? 
Can explain unconventional monetary policy? 
Includes money? 
Shows how the central bank targets an interest rate? 
Includes credit and banking? 
 
 
no 
no 
no 
no 
yes  
no 
no 
yes 
n/a 
yes  
no 
no 
no 
no 
 
 
 
yes 
yes 
yes 
yes 
yes 
yes 
yes 
 
 
With that, the I-LM curve is an useful alternative to the LM curve and to 
interest rate rules – both for teaching and research. 
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